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1. - Introduction 
Public  finance  is  the sub-discipline  of economics  that  deals with  taxes, 
fiscal  policy  and government  enterprise in  general.  In order to assess the 
case in behalf of taxation commonly made in this field, I shall analyze the 
public finance  textbooks  of ATKINSON  and STIGLITZ  119801, DUE  [1963], 
MUSGRAVE  I19591 and  SHOUP  [1969]'. I  have  chosen  textbooks  because 
they  are  a  distillation  of knowledge,  methodology  and perspective  of  an 
entire profession; they are the amalgamation of what  is  considered  correct 
and important. I have  chosen  these four because  they are  a representative 
sample, and highly respected  amongst the practitioners of economic ortho- 
doxy  in  this  domain. 
The  category  of  economic  study we  shall  consider  is  sometimes called 
government  finance,  sometimes public  economics, and sometimes  gover- 
nment  economics.  But  whatever  the  name,  this  field  is  very  different 
from  all  other sub-disciplines  of economics in  one important respect. In 
every  other case, whether  it  is  micro  or macro,  trade  or  labor,  business 
cycles  or money,  resources  or growth,  development  or industrial  organi- 
zation,  managerial  or accounting,  the  practitioner  plunges  right  into the 
subject  matter. 
In public finance, in contrast, and only in public finpce, there is first an 
attempt to justify the very existence of the topic. In every textbook on this 
theme I have examined, plus the four to be scrutinized here in detail, there 
is  always an introductory  chapter, and in  some  cases two  or three, where 
I  Unless  otherwise  noted, all  unmarked  page'references  refer  to these  four  texts. 
According to Due (p. 13), Musgrave's  text *is the modern classic in  the field of govern- 
ment  finance -. 
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the author feels  compelled  to  defend  against  the charge  that  the  whole 
enterprise  rests  upon  a  foundation  of sand3. 
How can we  account for this felt need to vindicate the very subject mat- 
ter? Although this can only be speculative, one possibility is that public fin- 
ance is the only economic field studying activities to which the use of force 
is  intrinsic. 
Shoup, however, attempts to deny this. Or, rather, to mitigate this claim, 
by asserting that other institutions beside government also avail themselves 
of the use  of force. He states  (p. 4):  <(The  government’s  system  operates 
with the aid of a legal power of compulsion. But in many countries one or 
more members of a family or of a religious or charitable organization have 
possessed or still do possess legal power of compulsion over other members. 
The chief difference  between the government’s allocating system and that 
of the family, church, or other nonprofit institution lies  in the degree  of 
impersonality of the rules  under which  the government distributes  its ser- 
vices  and  allocates  the  burden  of  covering  the  costs>>. 
But this is unconvincing. For one thing, there is surely a great difference 
between the way  a private charity engages in  fund raising, and the govern- 
ment’s tax  system. In the former case, this is accomplished through purely 
voluntary means; in the latter, there is  a resort to threats of incarceration4. 
Shoup, perhaps,  could  attempt  to  defend  his  position  by  claiming  that 
families do exercise coercion over children. But this would not be definitive 
in the case of adults, where families, religious  and charitable organizations 
treat their members on a voluntary basis. For another, while there is indeed 
an important  difference  between government and these charitable  institu- 
tions with regard  to impersonality, this doesn’t begin to account for the dis- 
tinction between the public and private sectors, to which the latter belongs. 
If not impersonality, of what, then, does the justification for the tax  sys- 
tem consist? Although each of our four authors places a different emphasis 
on the matter, a definite pattern emerges. On the whole, they all subscribe 
to the view  that government action (i.e.,  taxation) is  justified  because  of 
market failure.  In what is  to  follow I  shall consider the charge of market 
’  For  example, at the conclusion of his  introductory  chapter in  this  regard, DUE  (p. 17) 
states: .These  considerations account for the undertaking of the great  bulk  of present-day 
government activities.  Likewise,  they provide  a jusiiJration  for replacement  of the  market 
mechanism by  central  decision  making on the part  of the government.  (emphasis added). 
‘  This point can  be interpreted in  both  a value-free (positive economic) and value-laden 
(normative economic) manner. From the latter perspective, it is usually stipulated as immoral 
for one person to demand funds from another against his will - for whatever purpose. Excep- 
tions, however, are commonly made for state tax collections,  but for an alternative  view, see 
SPOONER,  [1870,  19731.  This distinction  is also based on a positive economic category, our 
main focus of interest in the present paper. For there is ,111  the difference in  weltare econom- 
ics  between  a forced  interaction  md a  voluntary one. In  the latter  case  we  are  entitled  to 
deduce, 3t  least  tx ante, that  both  parties  gain  from  the  exchange.  In  the  former, no such 
conclusion  is  ever  warranted. 
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failure under seven different rubrics:  1.  Perfect  competition; 2.  Externali- 
ties;  3.  Growth  and  economic  development;  4.  Merit  goods;  5.  Equity; 
6. Obstacles  to  charging  a  price  and  7.  Stability. 
2. - Perfect  Competition 
It is  charged  by the public finance community that the real world lacks 
the conditions which together comprise perfect competition: perfect, cost- 
less  and full  information; demand  curves  of infinite elasticity; numerous 
sellers  and  buyers  in  all  markets;  homogeneous  products;  equilibrium; 
futures  markets  and  insurance  for  all  conceivable  goods  and  services’. 
This absence of perfect  competition is very important in the view of the 
public finance economists. Due, for example, goes so far as to assert  that 
((freedom  of choice is interfered with ... when competition ceases to be enti- 
rely perfect  >>  (p. 11). But there is a serious  objection with such a stance. It 
fails to distinguish between lack of free choice, and lack of numerous alter- 
natives. An otherwise free man who has the unfortunate  luck to live on a 
desert island, or to have  been  born  thousand  of years  ago, has very few 
options, compared to most people in modern western industrialized  coun- 
tries.  But  unless  he is  under some sort of compulsion  (i.e.,  in prison), he 
does  not  lack  free  choice.  Rather, he merely  has  fewer alternatives than 
might  be  available  to  him  under  other  situations. 
Perfect  competition, moreover,  is  unlikely  to  increase  the  number  of 
options. To the extent that is  meaningful to  even discuss  this model as  a 
possible description of reality, the requirement that all goods be homogene- 
ous would on the face of it practically guarantee fewer choices than at pres- 
ent. For the heterogeneity of foods and services is surely one of the greatest 
sources  of  variety. 
Nor  has  the  perfectly  competitive  model  itself  gone  uncriticized6. 
Among the basic  fallacies  is  that perfect  competition, paradoxically, mis- 
construes competition. It is usually operationally defined in terms of four- 
firm concentration ratios: the percentage of an industry’s sales, profits, out- 
put, employment, etc.,  is  accounted  for by  the largest  four firms.  If this 
ratio is  “low”, perfect competition is said  to be approximated, but if it is 
high ”, the market is said to be a  imperfect ”. But all such measurements are 
This latter condition is especially  stressed by ATKINSON  and SrIGLITZ  (pp. 7 and 349). 
.But the lack of any specific market (say, that for mud pies) is no indication of inefficiency. 
Rather, it  may be  evidence  that market actors contemplate receiving  insufficient returns  for 
setting up such markets. In any case, all academic critics of the non-existence of a given mar- 
ket are free to set up one on their own. That they do not do so, and instead cavil at the inac- 
tivity  ot others,  is  evidence  not  of  market  inefficiency,  but  of  their  own  timidity. 
’  See  ARMENTANO  [1972,  1982,  19861;  BLOCK [1982]; ROTHBARD [1970, chapter  101; 
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entirely  arbitrary‘.  No one  has  ever  shown where  “low” leaves  off and 
where “high” begins. Equally arbitrary is the very definition of an industry. 
If  narrowly  conceived (i.e.,  colas)  the  ratio will  be  “high”, but if broadly 
determined (i.e.,  all  beverages)  the ratio  will  be  “low”. But  again  we  are 
vouchsafed  no non-capricious  delineation. And this is  because  no proper 
definition of an industry exists, despite the crucial  need for it on the part 
of those who believe in the coherence of the perfectly competitive scheme. 
If anything in this murky field  is  certain, it is  that were  “perfect competi- 
tion” ever attained, it would be the very opposite of rivalry. With zero pro- 
fit,  no innovations and product  definition, no continuing struggle  to woo 
customers away from one another, “perfect competition ” is no competition 
at  all. 
There is  also the difficulty that the absolutely  crucial  concept  of entry 
restrictions is all  but ignored, despite protestations to the contrary. During 
the years that  I.B.M.  and ALCOA were  the only sellers  of computer ser- 
vices and aluminium, respectively, there was complete free entry; that is, no 
laws existed which prohibited or even discouraged competition. As a result, 
both companies acted competitively, that is, rivalrously, fending off poten- 
tial competition  by  innovating,  cost  cutting, reducing prices,  etc.  In  con- 
trast,  the  organization  of  taxicabs  in  most  cities  resembles  the perfectly 
competitive  model: there  are  numerous  buyers  md sellers,  and only one 
price  is  charged. But  new  entry is  strictly prohibited. Paradoxically, then, 
advocates  of  “perfect  competition ”  must  see  the  highly  regulated  taxi 
industry as closer to their ideal  than the almost completely free computer 
and  aluminium  industries. 
In  a.  sense, the lack  of perfect  competition justification for government 
action is almost too good. For it proves far too much. It argues, in effect, that 
1) reality does not resemble an arbitrarily contrived model of the world; 
2) reality  should  resemble  this  model;  and  therefore 
3) the government should step in, to bring the world into closer confor- 
mity  with  the  model. 
But almost anything can be “proven” with this line of reasoning. Substi- 
tute for perfect competition objects moving faster than the speed of light, 
or people having more than two arms ‘,  and further government interven- 
tion  can  easily  be  justified. 
Even were it true, however, that the market is somehow deficient because 
the pinnacle of perfect competition has not been attained, it by no means 
follows that  further state encroachments on the economy would  improve 
The two-tirm  concentration  r~tio  in  a  boxing  ring  is  10Oob. Yet  anvone who has  ever 
‘ It one Jrm is  useful, 2nd two Jre even better, then do not three, four or even eight con- 
entered  this  milieu  knows  just  how  competitive  it  is.  Sre  ARMSTRONG  119821 
stitute  J  turrher  improvement! 
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matters. It is entirely possible that the governmental “cure” might be worse 
than the free enterprise “disease”. In reality, the so-called efforts to improve 
competition  through  anti-trust  activity  have  soon degenerated into rent- 
seeking, i.e.,  attacks on private property. Indeed, many have started off with 
that  very  intent  [KOLKO, 19631. 
The most potent charge of the perfect competitionists is not that monopo- 
listic firms earn excessive profits, but rather that they misallocate resources. 
But as ROTHBARD  [ 19701 shows, this thesis depends entirely on the existence 
of an independent and objective measure of optimal production under perfect 
competition. There are  curves and diagrams  aplenty which  illustrate such 
points, but nowhere is  there a criterion for determining the exact price and 
quantity for each product in a perfectly competitive world. 
In any case, there can be no optimal allocation of goods and services under 
government control. This, even the public finance writers concede. According 
to Due, for example, the only objective criterion for resource allocation would 
be the marginal social benefits equal to marginal social costs rule. However, he 
states (p. 21):  (c The comparison cannot be made on any meaningful basis. As a 
practical rnatfer, there is no  way in which the marginal social costs and benefits 
of activities which benefit the community as a whole can be measured; the 
MSB-MSC rule offers no actual guidance for policy determination (emphasis 
added)..  In his view, the whole process of government production is reduced 
to arbitrariness: (( In other  words, the optimum levels of each activity are deter- 
mined by the collective estimates of the community regarding relative desira- 
bility of particular degrees of attainment of various specific goals R  (p. 22).  In 
case you missed it, this means allocating resources by ballot-box voting. 
Another aspect of the lack of perfect competition is the lumpiness of fac- 
tors,  or  decreasing  cost  industries.  Unused  capacity, or conditions where 
marginal costs are lower than average costs, is a particularly irritating situa- 
tion for the public finance theorists (MUSGRAVE,  p. 7; DUE, p. 21),  on the 
grounds, again, of resource misallocation. But there are  several  difficulties 
here.  Costs  are  essentially  a  subjective  phenomenon  [BUCHANAN  and 
THIRLBY,  19811. The most basic  elemental  concept  of cost  is  alternative 
cost, the next  best  alternative foregone  by  the economic actor when  he 
makes a.  choice. But these costs can only be known to the chooser himself, 
not to outside observers, such as public finance economists who wring their 
hands  at  the  prospect  of  a  wrong  decision  being  made. 
Moreover,  the proponents  of  this  doctrine  are  lead  into a  reductio  ad 
absurdurn. Consider the additional seats in a movie theater which are left 
unoccupied when there is less than a full house. The objective costs of seat- 
ing these people, goes the argument, are zero. Allowing in additional people 
would  add to  their welfare,  without reducing that of anyone else9. Pareto 
, 
’  Presumably we \hould ignore the welfare of the proprietor. After all, he IS only in busi- 
ness  to  earn a  profit, a  most  despicable motive; so anything done to  him need  not be too 
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conditions are thus not met under real world conditions, because a positive 
price,  any  positive  price,  precludes  movie  attendance  by  at  least  some 
people. 
But this is a recipe for nationalizing all industries which have high set-up 
or fixed costs, and low marginal costs. If positive prices  are not allowed to 
be  charged in the case of newspapers, books, theatres, automobiles, air tra- 
vel, etc.,  these  industries cannot possibly  continue to  exist in the private 
sector. Actually, however, the reductio is even more serious. It extends to aiI 
goods and services, whatever the concatenation of fixed and variable costs. 
For once a  product  is  manufactured,  and is just sitting there in the ware- 
house, or on the retailer’s  shelf, for all intents and purposes it has virtually 
no alternative costs at all. Thus, according to the perfectly competitive doc- 
trine we  are  here considering, it should not be  sold for any positive price. 
Rather,  it  should  all  be  given  away  for  free. 
3. - Externa Iities 
Yet another source of private market resource misallocation are externali- 
ties, variously called: “  neighborhood effects ”, “public goods ”, “  non-exclu- 
dability ” and the “free rider” problem. These phenomena, too, justify taxa- 
tion  and the  government regulatory  activity,  at least  in the view  of  the 
public  finance  economists. 
Consider first external economies. Musgrave states (p. 7): ((Establishment 
of an expensive store may increase real  estate values in the neighborhood, 
even though the store cannot collect for the services thus rendered. A  rail- 
road  into new  territory may lead  to gains  in  economic development that 
greatly exceed the profits  to  the particular railroad. Since the market per- 
mits a price to be charged for only a part of the services rendered, the deve- 
lopment  may  be  unprofitable  from the private,  but  profitable  from  the 
public,  point  of  view.. 
However, the owner of the new  expensive  store is  the only one who 
knows for sure its future location. He is therefore in a position to buy up 
large swatches of the surrounding real estate before its value rises, due to his 
own investment.  (And the same reasoning, of course, applies to  the rail- 
road). Another way of internalising this sort of externality is with the self- 
enclosed  shopping center.  There, virtually  all  of the  supposed  spillover 
benefits  of  retail  commerce  are  captured  by  the  owner  of  the  mall. 
Now consider the case of external diseconomies. According to Musgrave 
(p.  7): ((Similarly, private operations may involve social  costs that are  not 
reflected  in private cost calculations and, hence, are not accounted  for by 
the market. A factory may pollute the air and damage an adjoining resort. 
The smoke nuisance is  a cost to  the particular community, yet it is  not a 
private  cost  to  the firm. The resort  owners cannot collect from  the firm 
since they cannot prevent its use of the common air. Thus, what is profit- 
able to the private firm may be unprofitable from a social point of view.. 
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These difficulties do abound, but they are not at all the fault of the mar- 
ketplace, as  the  critics  contend. The problem with  this  analysis  is  that it 
fails  to  take  into  account  the  institution  of  private  property  rights lo. 
In  the early  part  of the  19th century, there  were  a  spate of law  suits 
which  established the precedents which  now inform pollution  law  [HOR- 
WITZ,  19771. Before  that  time private  property  rights  were  all  but  sacro- 
sanct.  Plaintiffs  were  commonly  granted  injunctions  against  railroads, 
manufacturers, and other polluters. But then arose a doctrine according to 
which the private property right  not to be invaded by smoke particles  had 
to  be  “balanced” against  the “public good”. In effect, the courts began 
deciding that the public interest consisted of allowing polluters almost carte 
bfanche. As a result  industrial technology began  switching from non-pollu- 
tion  intensive methodologies to  pollution  intensive ones. Even a  particu- 
larly  ecologically-minded  manufacturer  would  be  powerless  to  stop  this 
oncoming tide. For  if  he refrained from unleashing pollutants, perhaps by 
investing in smoke prevention devices, he would be imposing a cost disad- 
vantage upon himself. Other things equal, he would tend to drive himself 
toward  bankruptcy. 
The  point  is,  despite  the  views  of  the  public  finance  theorists,  that 
market cannot exist in a vacuum. It rests on a foundation of law. If jurists 
will  not  protect  property  rights,  “external  diseconomies ”  will  indeed 
abound. But  this  is  an instance  of government  failure, not market failure 
The creed of externalities and public goods is also responsible for a fron- 
tal  attack  on the concept  of methodological  individualism. Due tells  us 
(p. 12) that  c(  there are various services, such as national defense, which yield 
substantial  benefits  to  society  over  and  above  those  which  may  accrue 
directly and separately to individuals>).  But  it  is difficult to envision what 
may exist ((over  and above  ... individuals )>.  On the contrary, one is tempted 
to  reply,  there  are only  individuals  in  society; there  is  nothing that  can 
accrue  to  any “society” which  exists  over and above the individuals who 
comprise it. There is certainly no such thing as a group mind or conscience 
which  can  experience benefits which somehow go unappreciated by mere 
individual  citizens  [BLOCK, 19801. 
[ROTHBARD,  19821. 
lo  Perhaps this is why ATKINSON  and STICLITZ  go so far afield in their comprehension of 
the  problem: they have made a decision to eschew consideration of property.  In their view 
(pp. 7-8) .Even  if the economy is well described by the competitive equilibrium model, the 
outcome may not be efficient because of externalities. There are innumerable examples where 
the  actions  of  an individual  or firm  affect  others directly  (not through the price  system). 
Because economic agents take into account only the direct  effects upon themselves.  not the 
effects on others, the decisions they make are likely not to be ‘efficient’. Air and water pollu- 
tion  are  perhaps  the  most  notable  examples”.  However,  they  dso state  (p. 4)  that  their 
.coverage  is selective. Some readers will no doubt be  horrified or disappointed by  the omis- 
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Further, it is  not true that all members of society benefit  equally from 
government defense expenditures, as  claimed  by  Musgrave  ‘I.  On the con- 
trary, some people  are “  hawks ”, who presumably  demand  ever-increasing 
military budgets; some are “doves”, who call for cut backs. And others are 
pacifists,  who  don’t  benefit  at  all  from armaments. For  them weaponry 
- even  limited  to  defensive  purpose  -  is  actually  a  harm. 
We turn now to the claim of non-excludability. According to Musgrave 
(p. 8), .People  who do not pay for the (social) services cannot be excluded 
from the benefits that result; and since they cannot be excluded from the 
benefits, they will  not engage in  voluntary  payments. Hence, the market 
cannot satisfy such wants. (Government) budgetary provision  is  needed if 
they are to be satisfied at all >’.  But excludability is just an example ofinternalis- 
ing externalities. It is merely a matter of common sense, and sometimes of 
research and investment  into new “  fence-building ” technology. If the will 
is there, the job can usually be done. Of  course, if it is legally prohibited, it 
usually  cannot occur. In  such a case,  however, the fault does not lie with 
the market, but  rather with  the statist prohibitions on the functioning of 
the  market. 
Consider the case of the old-fashioned baseball stadiums. In days of yore, 
fans would congregate on the roofs of surrounding buildings  to watch an 
important game, such as the world series. The baseball companies were thus 
unable to exclude these  non-paying viewers,  and, according to  the theory, 
not  only  should  not  have  been  able  to continue operations,  but  never 
should have been able to set up a business in the first place. In the event, 
however, the  solution was  simple: building  higher fences; and ultimately, 
domed  stadiums. 
How could this work in the case of defense? One possibility might be a 
geographical in-gathering of like-minded people within the U.S. on grounds 
of compatibility on defense matters.  For example, the hawks might  more 
closely congregate in Orange Country, California, or in Texas; the doves 
might assemble  in Greenwich Village,  and on the upper west  side of New 
York  City; in  Cambridge, Massachusetts, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and in 
the People’s Republic of Santa Monica. This tendency might be  aided  by 
legislation easing restrictive covenants, so that landlords and property own- 
ers would not rent or sell  unless the tenant or purchaser agreed  to contri- 
bute to a private defense agency (or not, as the case may be). Further, such 
private enterprise protection firms might issue buttons, stickers or signs to 
their  clients, in  this  way  better enabling the exclusion  of all  non partici- 
pants  from  the  benefits  [BLOCK, 1983;  FRIEDMAN,  19731. 
Excludability is  not  inherent  in  goods - the public  finance error, any 
more than value is inherent in goods - the Marxist error. The fashioning of 
better  fences, jamming  devices, and  other ways  to  discriminate  between 
” He states (p.  12): ((Social  wants are those wants satisfied by services which must be con- 
sumed  in  equal  amounts  by  dll~~. 
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payers and non-payers, is an entrepreneurial task. To be sure, it is sometimes 
hard to conceive of what business could accomplish in these areas, but this is 
only because markets are currently not allowed  to operate in this regard ”. 
Sometimes the externalities argument is couched in terms of social wants 
and public goods. The complaint, here, is that the tie between payment and 
benefit  is  broken; the advantages of a would-be commercial enterprise are 
not (cannot be!) limited to customers, so no one is willing to pay. The con- 
tention  is  that we  all  benefit from national  defense, courts, public health 
measures, etc., whether we contribute to their financing or  not. As a result, 
a “Let George do it” attitude develops. Force, therefore, brutal naked force, 
must  be  resorted  to  if  these  services  are  to  be  produced. 
In this regard  Musgrave  (p. 10) tells  us: (<The  government must step in, 
and compulsion  is  called  for..  And again (pp. 10-11): .A  political process 
must  be  substituted for the  market  mechanism,  and individuals must be 
made  to  adhere  to  the  group  decision ”. 
On this  theory,  however, it would  be  difficult  to  account  for the exi- 
stence of any charitable or civic organizations. Consider such groups as the 
NAACP, ASPCA, ACLU, Salvation Army, United Way, March of Dimes, 
Red Cross, MS  Foundation, Public Radio and Television. In each case, all 
ties between benefit and payment are cut. None of these public benefactors 
is able to exclude non-payers from receiving benefits  [HUGHES,  1989). Fur- 
ther,  this  view  of  the public  finance  ideologues  is  inconsistent  with  the 
creation  of  the  very  government  they  are  so  anxious to  justify.  For  the 
state, on their view, is a public good. We are all free riders. If I start a gover- 
nment, it will benefit you too; so I won’t do it. Nor will you, for such activ- 
ity will  benefit  But  this only points to  a very  flawed logic  in the 
public finance lexicon. It is surely erroneous to defend government and its 
tax  collections on a theory which implies that no such institution can be 
created  in  the  first  place. 
4. - Economic  Growth 
The  market  is  also  said  to  misallocate  resources  between  present  and 
future consumption. I.e., it is charged that the rate of growth is not optimal 
‘’  Note that we  are  not advocating that any such  new  industries  be allowed  to operate. 
Indeed, we are not advocating anything, for such would be the task of normative economics. 
To engage in such matters would take us away from our agenda, which is a positive economic 
criticism  of  the  public  finance  case  for  taxation.  ’’  We are here discussing the creation of the government, not its continued exIsfencc. It  is 
important to distinguish between these two situations because only the former, not the latter, 
is  incompatible with  the philosophy  underlying the public finance literature.  For  once the 
state exists, it can force all people to pay taxes; thus there need  not be  any *spillover bene- 
tits ”. But this argument cannot apply to its very creation, bqore it is able to extract payments 
from  all  and  sundry. 150  Walter Block 
under free  enterprise, and that this, too, is  a justification for Sovernment 
taxation and expenditure policy. In the view of Musgrave (p. 3,  (c other dis- 
crepancies  may  arise  from  differences  between  public  and  private ...  time 
preferences.I4.  And Shoup maintains  (pp. 38-39) that  <<the  r.ite  at which 
income per  head  will  grow  under full  employment can  be  increased  by 
public finance  measures  that restrain  certain  types  of consuinption,  thus 
freeing resources for investment in the broadest sense, including education, 
medical care, and improvements in the pattern  and level  of  nutrition  for 
children  and  working  age  adults  that  increase  their  productive  capacity, 
present  or future, by  more  than the cost  of these improvements  (all  dis- 
counted to a given  date). Some of those whose  consumption  is  restricted 
for this purpose will object, not agreeing that the present sacritice is worth 
the gain, present  and future, even  if  that  gain  materializes  in  time to be 
enjoyed  by  them  rather  than  only  by  a  future  generation-. 
Surprisingly,  all  such  public  finance  attempts  to  show  lion  optimal 
growth patterns assert that standards of living will increase too slowly. This 
is in sharp contrast to  the view that growth is toofast, which  IS espoused 
equally firmly in the “limits to growth ” literature [EHRLICH.  (;;\LBRAITH]. 
Which is correct? The point is  that neither one is; that the onlv firm basis 
upon which  to  judge  whether  or not economic growth  is  Optimal is  the 
time preference rates of the individual economic actors. But this IS precisely 
the point rejected by both sets of critics of the marketplace! Nzither, unfor- 
tunately, wrestles  with  this basic question.  Neither  proves  th.ir  the saving 
consumption  decisions  made  by  the  individual  are  (( inefficient ),. 
Let us  focus on the public finance claim that growth is too slow in the 
capitalist system. Even  granting  this  dubious proposition, it  b\- no  means 
follows that  government, fiscal  and other such policies are  a  Sood means 
toward attaining a higher growth rate. For as the best  research  in this area 
shows [BAUER,  1971, 1981, 19851, in reality the state actually retards eco- 
nomic development. If  the  public  finance  theorists  really  favor enhanced 
rates of progress, the last thing they should advocate is an expanded govern- 
ment sector. 
5. - Merit  Goods 
Let us review for a moment. So far, we have examined the public finance 
writer’s  treatment of perfect competition, externalities and growth. We have 
l4  The following sentence  reads:  .Indeed,  if  we  assume  that  any one penon’s welfare 
depends on that of all others - a case of keeping up with the Joneses - we  must conclude that 
the satisfaction of all private wants involves gams and losses that are not accounied for in the 
market )). But surely this involves a reductio ad absurdurn, for this is a justificatic:1  tor a gover- 
nment takeover ot  ull commercial activity. It proves  far too much, md  in doir. so, exhibits 
yet  again  the  fallacy  of  the  argument. 
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noted their attempt to justify taxes on the ground that the market, if left to 
its own devices, would misallocate resources  in these three respects.  It was 
contended  that  the laissez-faire system  could  not maximize  welfare  from 
the point of view  of the average person, or consumer. That is  to say,  the 
vantage point of consumer sovereignty took center stage.  It was made the 
core  of the  analysis. 
And now, we  arrive at their investigation of merit goods. Here, we shall 
see, there is a complete reversal of field. Instead of arguing that the market 
is deficient in that it misallocates resources, these writers now maintain that 
although the free enterprise system does not misallocate resources from the 
vantage point of consumer sovereignty, government should still be brought 
in,  precisely  for  that  purpose! 
What are merit wljnts? According to Shoup (p. 43), <(Certain  private-sec- 
tor outlays are deemed so laden with a public purpose that they are stimu- 
lated  by  tax  laws  or subsidies;  philanthropic  and religious  outlays  are 
examples..  Musgrave  (p.  13) holds  that  merit  wants  are  .considered  so 
meritorius that their satisfaction is provided for through the public budget, 
over and above what  is provided for through  the market  and paid for by 
private buyers ... Public services aimed at the satisfaction of merit wants in- 
clude such items as publicly furnished school luncheons, subsidized low-cost 
housing, and free education. Alternatively, certain wants may be stamped as 
undesirable,  and  their  satisfaction  may  be  discouraged  through  penalty 
taxation, as  in the case of liquor  ...  The satisfaction of  merit wants,  its vely 
nature, involves interference with consumer preferences. In view of this, does the 
satisfaction  of merit wants  have  a place  in  a normative  theory  of public 
economy, based  upon the premise of individual preference in a democratic 
society? A position of extreme individualism could demand  that all merit 
wants be disallowed, but this is  not a sensible view*. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(p. 8) describe merit wants as .a  category of goods where the state makes a 
judgement that certain goods are “good” or “bad”, and attempts to encour- 
age the former (eg., education) and discourage the latter (e.g.,  alcohol). This 
is  different fTom  the  arguments concerning  extemaiities and public goods, in that 
zith merit wants, the  “public”  judgement differs from the private evaluation, riect- 
ing  a  purely  individualistic  view  of  socieg)) (emphasis  added). 
But this will not do at all. The public finance economists cannot have it 
both ways. If it was so important not to misallocate resources from the per- 
spective of consumer sovereignty before (eg, their analysis of perfect com- 
?etition, externalities, growth) how can the very opposite now be required, 
namely  a setting aside of the sovereign consumer’s  desire for alcohol, and 
*wish  to  neglect  education? 
Alternatively, if resource allocation in service of the sovereign consumer 
is  so  unimportant that it can  be  set aside in favour of these  paternalistic 
nerit wants, why should anyone pay attention to arguments purporting to 
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The public finance writers cannot both have their cake 3nd eat it. Their 
merit want concept makes a mockery of their allocation concerns. The two 
are  contradictory.  At least  one set  of arguments  must go by  the  board. 
6. - Income Redistribution 
At first glance, it might be thought difficult for avowedly value-free  eco- 
nomists to  prove  that  income  redistribution  follows  from  the basic  pre- 
mises of their discipline. But  such niceties  do not for a moment dissuade 
the  public  finance  theorists  from  this  task.  What  are  their  arguments? 
Atkinson and Stiglitz announce (p. 6) that <<Pareto  efficiency does not 
ensure that the distribution that emerges from the competitive process is  in 
accord with the prevailing concepts of equity (whatever these may be). One 
of  the  primary  activities  of  the  government  is  indeed  redistribution >>. 
Indeed? Surely, before we  accept any such conclusion we  must be  shown 
that there are certain specific concepts of equity ‘j which done follow from 
economic principles. Needless to say, this has not even been attempted, let 
alone accomplished. And why bring up Pareto efficiency? This is  complete- 
ly dependent upon  the vantage point of consumer sovereignty, which  has 
been  rejected  in  the  merit  want  analysis. 
Musgrave’s  defence  does  not  fare  any  better.  He declares  (p.  17) that 
(c  there was a  time when the provision of public services was considered its 
[government’s] only legitimate function, and it was argued that “the fiscal 
problem  pure  and simple” should not be  confused with  “alien considera- 
tions of social  and economic  policy ”.  Subsequently, however,  most  people 
came  to  recognize  that  the  revenue-expenditure  process  of  government  is 
bound to  have social  and economic effects,  and that these  may  be  aimed 
usefully at purposes not directly connected with the immediate objective of 
satisfying public  wants.  Adjustments  in  the state  of distribution  are  one 
such purpose ’) (emphasis added). This defence consists of a semi-reasonable 
opening  statement,  coupled  with  a  gigantic  “however”, followed  by  no 
more than a bald assertion that (<most  people.  in effect have changed their 
minds  about  this  matter.  No reasons  are  given  for  supposing  that  this 
change of heart was preferable to the opinions which originally prevailed 16. 
Is  Whatever concepts of equity there may be floating around in society will hardly do. For 
it  is  doubtless true  that the  income distribution  which emerges as  a result for market place 
activity  will  not  be  in  accord  with  many  concepts  of  equity. 
DUE  (p.  12) argues along similar lines:  11 The market economy, even with relatively  free 
competition, has resulted  in a pattern  of income distribution among families which opinion 
in society has typically regarded as inequitable, because of the high degree of inequality *. But 
is  “opinion in society  correct? How much inequality is  too high? Why should only money 
incomes be subiect to forced egalitarlanism? Suppose we had the ability to redistribute  intelli- 
gence. or serenity. or health: is there anything in the axioms of economics that would force 
us to recognize the v~lidity  ofcoerclve transfers of these characteristics? These are among the 
questions  avoided  by  the  public  tinance  advocates  of  wedlth  transfers. 
Shoup,  in  contrast,  does  attempt  to  base  the  normative  standard  of 
in  the positive  realm. He opines (p. 23)  that .there  is  a  generally 
accepted standard of equity, or fairness, with respect to public finance mea- 
sures: equal treatment of those equally circumstanced. It  is  a principle pre- 
dominantly founded in analogy with equal treatment before the law  >>.  But 
this  analogy is  only tenuously  connected with  present  considerations. Jus- 
tice  would  indeed be  outraged if  of two parties  guilty of the same crime, 
one were  hanged and the other set free. But is this sufficient ground for in 
effect  robbing  Peter  to  pay  Paul?”. 
Due’s analysis of this question is lengthy (pp. 9-10), but very informative, 
and worthy of quotation in full. He starts out in a quite reasonable manner, 
a  vast  improvement on the treatment  accorded  to this subject by  many of 
his public finance colleagues, but then he takes it all back. He does so with 
howler of a “  however”, which is  probably the largest and most dramatic 
“however” in  the  entire  history  of  economic  thought. 
<<(A)  generally accepted goal is that of a distribution of income which is 
regarded  as  equitable by  the consensus of opinion in society. Since equity 
in  income distribution,  as in all matters, is  based  upon value judgements, 
economics can be of no real assistance in defining it. It is sometimes argued 
that economic welfare  requires a distribution of income such that the mar- 
ginal  satisfactions  of  all  persons  are  equal, since  otherwise  a  shifting of 
income  from  some  persons  to  others  would  increase  total  satisfaction. 
Actually, this statement has no  significant meaning, because of the impossibil- 
ity of making interpersonal utility comparisons, that is, of comparing relative 
satisfactions obtained by different persons. There is no  way in which the satis- 
faction received by one person from the consumption of a particular good can 
be compared with that received by another person from the consumption of 
the same good. It is not possible to say that two persons with the same income, 
accumulated  wealth, number of  dependents,  and other external circums- 
tances  receive the same satisfaction and thus are “equally well off” in any 
subjective sense. It is impossible to show that a person with a million-dollar 
income receives less satisfaction from the expenditures of an additional dol- 
lar  that  does  a  person  with  an  income  of one  thousand  dollars>>. 
So far, so good. Due has brilliantly closed the door on all sorts of govern- 
ment  interventionism,  in  the  name  of unsubstantiated  value  judgments, 
and  illicit  interpersonal  comparisons of utility.  But  now  comes that infa- 
mous  “  however ”. 
There is also the religious analogy. In the bible [MATTEW,  chapter 20, verses  1-16] there 
is a story of workers who begin their (equally productive) labors at different times of the day, 
and all end at the same time.  Nevertheless,  they  are  all paid  the same amount of money at 
the end of the day, The moral of the story drawn by some left wing commentators is that this 
IS  unfair,  because  unequals  are  being  treated  equally.  But  the  employment contract  is  an 
agreement between consenting adults. The employer, sure!y,  can in effect make a  free gift of 
money to those laborers who began later in the day, without being accused of anything unto- 
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(<  However,  ))  Due continues, ((persons make judgements about equity in 
the distribution of income, on the basis  of which they evaluate the actual 
patterns  which occurs with  a  market  economy. Furthermore, in any parti- 
cular society, there is a substantial consensus of opinion about an optimum 
pattern; while there are extremists at both ends of the scale, the differences 
in opinion would typically appear to extend over a relatively narrow range. 
There is  widespread  acceptance of the view  that the actual distribution of 
income which  develops  in  a  market economy is  excessively  unequal, and 
thus that equity requires a closing-together of the extremes, the incomes of 
the very  poor being increased  and those  of persons at  the highest  levels 
being  reduced ”. 
Although these passages follow directly one from the other in Due’s text, 
it is as if they were written by two very different people. The first paragraph 
quoted  above wields  the basic  tools of economic analysis into a  coherent 
refutation of the case for redistribution; but the second is filled with every 
cliche which  mars the usual  public  finance  treatment of this subject. His 
earlier insights disappear  in  a  welter  of consideration  for public opinion, 
and  “widespread  acceptance”;  he  seems  to  feel  that  truth  consist  of  a 
sort  of ”golden  mean” between  extreme  views;  he  swallows  whole  the 
view  that incomes can be shown to be  “excessively unequal’’,  based solely 
on considerations  of positive  economics. All in all, a  most  disappointing 
discussion. 
7. - Obstacles  to Charging a  Price 
At one time virtually all  economists  at least  theoretically  conceded the 
preferability  of  the market  over the government  bureaucracy  on straight 
efficiency grounds. They did so, or were presumed to have done so, because 
of  the profit  and loss  weeding out process which  operates in  the former 
case,  but not the latter [MISES,  19691. But  this, unfortunately,  is  far from 
true  in  the  public  finance  literature. 
Contends Due (p.  16): (<It  is  generally presumed that private enterprise 
can produce more efficiently than governments, because of the effective sti- 
mulus provided  by  the profit  motive. However, there are certain situations 
in which  governmental  production  may  be  more  efficient,  in the broad 
sense of that term. In the first place, certain real  costs to  society may be 
avoided if the services are produced by the governments and provided free 
of charge to the users.  The savings are due primarily to elimination of the 
costs of collecting the charges  from the users;  the administrative expenses 
of the taxes used to finance the activities may be much less. For example, if 
sidewalks were provided by private enterprise, the cost of collection of tolls 
would far exceed the present costs of collection  of property taxes and spe- 
cial  assessments to finance sidewalks.  This is  an extreme example, but the 
same considerations apply to  the financing of highways, since the costs of 
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collection of tolls on all roads must greatly exceed the costs of administer- 
ing  the  gas  taxn  (emphasis  added). 
When  Due uses  the  word  ahowever”, we  have  learned  that  we  must 
tread  carefully. The problem here is that he has in mind a  very unsophisti- 
cated  version  of  the  free  enterprise  system.  In  sidewalk  provision,  for 
example, he seems to picture pedestrians stopping to pay at a toll booth set 
up near each home or store they pass. In actual point of fact many miles of 
private  sidewalks  now  exist - in shopping malls,  condominium develop- 
ments - and there are  no costs  of collection; rather, the  service is  given 
away  for free,  as  a  package  deal  offered  to  shoppers, guests, owners and 
tenants. In the event, these private sidewalks are far more safer, cleaner and 
in better repair than their public counterparts; and this  is  because  of the 
usuaI  profit  and  loss  considerations. 
A similar analysis applies to the case of private highways  [BLOCK, 1983; 
ROTHBARD,  19731. Under free enterprise, motorists would not have to stop 
every  few  feet at a toll  booth, as  Due implies.  Rather, sophisticated elec- 
tronic monitoring devices could be utilized as a low-cost  collection techni- 
que. Alternatively, a leaf could be borrowed from the Singapore experience. 
That  system  utilizes  differentially  colored  windshield  display  permits  to 
indicate  time  of day  and  geographical  area  where  travel  is  allowed.  This 
works on a principle similar to the one used in coin-operated private park- 
ing  lots. 
It is undoubtedly true that governmeni toll booth systems are vastly inef- 
ficient. As presently operated, limited access highway motorists are forced 
to stop their high speed travel  every few miles in order to pay a  few pen- 
nies. This system is as galling as it is costly. It is even likely that a gas or  pro- 
perty tax  may be  a  more efficient collection device”.  But  it by  no means 
follows as Due seems to  think it  does that pivafe collection costs would 
therefore be more expensive than either a tax or the present toll booth sys- 
tem. We cannot conclude that absence of collection costs can render public 
operation  of  commercial  ventures  more  efficient  than  private. 
8. - Stabilization 
A recurring claim  all throughout the public finance literature is  that the 
unencumbered  market is  subject to  sudden bouts of depression, and that 
government intervention is thus needed to keep the economy on an even 
keel. Musgrave’s statement (p. 22) is symptomatic of the genre: <(A  free eco- 
nomy, if uncontrolled,  tends  towards more or less  drastic fluctuations in 
The gas tax has the disadvantage that it cannot be used for peak-load pricing.  The statist 
toll booth system now in operation could be used in this manner, but given bureaucratic arte- 
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prices and employment; and apart from relatively  short-term swings, malad- 
justments  of a  secular  sort may arise  towards unemployment  or inflation. 
Public policy  must  assume a  stabilizing function  in  order to  hold within 
tolerable  limits  departures  from  high  employment  and  price  stability )>. 
This view amounts to the reiteration of the old familiar standby, “market 
failure”. But  here, as  in  all  other cases  where  this  charge  is  made,  it  is 
“government failure” which  is  really  responsible for the  flaw  mistakenly 
seen  in  the  market. 
Unemployment, for example, is  not intrinsic to  the capitalist order. On 
the contrary, it is brought about through all sorts of unwise  and mischiev- 
ous government interventions: minimum wage legislation; legal support for 
unions to raise  wage  rates  above productivity levels; the Davis-Bacon  Act; 
“  fair ”  labor  standards;  occupational  licensure;  excessive  taxation  [WIL- 
LIAMS,  19821. 
Similarly, Musgrave  to  the contrary notwithstanding,  inflation is  always 
and ever a strictly governmental phenomenon [FRIEDMAN  and SCHWARTZ, 
1963; WALKER,  19761.  Price  inf-lation  depends  crucially  upon  excessive 
monetary creation, and in the modern era of central banking this is solely a 
prerogative of the state. It can only be alleged that the market is responsible 
for  inflation  from  a  perspective  that  is  innocent  of  basic  economics. 
The 1929 depression is commonly though to be a product of the unham- 
pered market place. This is perhaps “exhibit A”  of the public finance point 
of view on this matter. But even here, despite widely accepted man-in-the- 
street opinion, there is  strong evidence which indicates that far from being 
a result of the working of the free economy, the great depression, too, came 
about because of unwise government policy: the Smoot-Hawley tariff; arti- 
ficial controls on wages and prices, keeping them inflexible in a downward 
direction. Most important, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) lay a large part of 
the blame for this debicle at the door of the Federal Reserve System, which 
presided over the reduction of the money supply by one third in the short 
space  of  a  few  months”. 
9. - Conclusion 
We are forced to conclude that the main task  set for themselves by the 
public  finance  writers  has  not  been  met:  they  have  failed  to  justify - 
without resorting to unsupported value judgments - the institution of taxa- 
tion. We  cannot infer, based  on this examination, that taxes  are not justi- 
fied.  We  can  only  maintain  that  their  self-imposed  task  has  not  been 
’’  As well, in the Austrian  analysis, the previous bout of inflation during the 1920s artifi- 
cially  cncouraged and overstlmulated basic  industries  and round dbout methods of  produc- 
tion: thls. in their view, led to the debicle of the thirties [see ROTHRARD.  1975: MILES.  1966, 
1971;  HAYEK,  1932,  1933;  for  .I  critique  of  This  view,  bee  TuLom. 1988). 
accomplished, and that the whole question of how md  whether taxes may 
be  justified  is  still  unresolved’’. 
This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs for textbook writers  in a  sub-dis- 
cipline of economics. After all, a text is supposed to be LIR  amalgamation of 
well  established doctrine in the field.  Either this task  should be  acquitted 
with far greater success, or it is advisable that it be left off entirely from the 
table of contents. Then, public finance could address its proper task: a posi- 
tive economic evaluation of the effects of taxation, and not a deeply flawed 
normative  justification  of  the  tax  sistem. 
Are there any public finance texts which conclude from their initial  examination of 
these  matters  that taxes  are not justified? Not to the knowledge of  the present  writer.  The 
writers  in  this field act almost as  if it would  be  awkward were  any such conclusion to  be 
drawn; that is such a case it would be exceedingly difficult tor the remainder ot  the book to 
be written. But this is to contlate the normative and the positive.  Surely one can engage in ,I 
positive analysis of the effect of a policy without concerning oneself with the moral iuat1til.i- 
tion  of  that  policy. .  -..- 
158  Walter Block 
REFERENCE 
ARMENTANO,  D.T., Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of  a Policy Failure,  New York, Wiley, 1982.  -  , The  Myths  of  Antitrust,  New  Rochelle,  N.Y.,  Arlington  House,  1972. 
-,  Antitrust  Policy:  Thc  Case for  Repeal, Washington  D.C.,  Cato,  1986. 
ARMSTRONG,  D.,  Competition  vs.  Monopoly,  Vancouver,  The  Fraser  Institute,  1982. 
ATKINSON,  A. B.  and STIGLITZ,  J. E.,  Lectures  on Public  Economics, New  York, McGraw-Hill, 
1980. 
BAUER,  P., Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates on  Development Economics, London, Wei- 
denfield,  1971. 
-,  Equalig, The Third World and Economic Delusion, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard Univer- 
sity  Press,  1981. 
-,  <(Liberation  Theology and Third World Development *,  Theology, Third  World Deve- 
lopment and Economic Justice, BLOCK  W., and SHAW  D. (eds.), Vancouver, The Fraser Insti- 
tute,  1985. 
BLOCK,  W.,  The  Combines  Investigation  Act, Vancouver,  The  Fraser  Institute,  1982. 
-,  c(  Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads )),  Journal of  Libertarian Studies, 
Spring  1983. 
, <<On  Robert  Nozick’s  “On Austrian  Methodology”.,  Inquiry,  Fall  1980. 
BROZEN,  Y.,  Concentration, Mergers  and  Public  Policy,  New  York,  MacMillan,  1982. 
BUCHANAN,  J. M., and THIRBLY,  G. F. eds., L.S.E.  Essays on  Cost, New York, New York University 
DI LORENZO,  T.,  u Competition and Political  Entrepreneurship: Austrian Insights into Public 
DUE,  J. F., Government Financc: An  Economic Analysis, Homewood (Illinois), Irwin, 1963, third 
EHRLICH,  P. R.,  The  Population  Bomb,  New  York,  Ballantine,  1986. 
FRIEDMAN,  D.,  The  Machinery  of  Freedom,  New  York,  Harper  and  Row,  1973. 
FRIEDMAN,  M. and  SCHWARTZ,  A.J.,  A  Monetary  History  of  the  US.,  1867-1960, Princeton 
GALBRAITH,  J. K.,  The  Underdeveloped  Country, Toronto,  CBC  Publications,  1967. 
Press,  1980. 
Choice  Theory.,  Review  of  Austrian  Economics,  vol.  11,  1988. 
edition. 
(New Jersey),  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research,  1963. 
, The  Afluent  Sociey,  Boston,  Houghton  Mifflin,  1958. 
, The  New  Industrial  State,  Boston,  Houghton  Mifflin,  1972. 
, American  Capitalism,  Boston,  Houghton  Mifflin,  1956. 
, Economics  and  the  Public  Purpose,  Boston  Houghton  Mifflin,  1973. 
, Monetary  Theory  and  the  Trade  Cyck, New  York,  A.  M.  Kelley,  1966  (1933). 
HAYEK,  F. A.,  Prices  and  Production,  London,  Routledge,  1932. 
HORWITZ,  M.  J.,  The Transformation of  American Law, 1780-1860, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard, 
HUGHES,  M.,  The  Voluntary Seruice  Sector in Canada, Vancouver, The Fraser  Institute,  1989, 
KOLKO, G.,  The  Triumph  of  Conservatism,  Chicago,  Quadrangle,  1963. 
VON  MISES,  L.,  Human  Action,  Chicago,  Regnery,  1966, third  edition. 
1977. 
forthcoming. 
,  -Profit and Loss *, in Planning  for Freedom, South Holland, II.,  Libertarian Press, 1969. 
, Thc  Thcory  of  Monry and  Credit, New York,  Foundation  for Economic Education, 
MUSGRAVE,  R. A.,  The  Theory of Public Finance: A  Study in Public Economy, New York, Maraw- 
ROTHBARD,  M.N.,  Man,  Economy  and  Statc,  Los  Angeles,  Nash,  1970. 
1971. 
Hill,  1959. 
, -Law,  Property  Rights  and  Air  Pollution.,  Cat0 Journal,  Spring  1982. 
, For  a  New  Libcrty,  New  York,  MacMillan,  1973. 
, America’s  Great  Dcprcssion,  Kansas  City,  Sheed  and  Ward,  1975. 
SHOUP, C. S.,  Public  Financc,  Chicago,  Aldine,  1969. 
SPOONER,  L.,  No  Trcason, Colorado  Springs,  Ralph  Myles,  1973  (1870). 
TULLOCK,  G., *Why the Austrians are Wrong About Depressions *,  Review  of  Austrian Eco- 
WILLIAMS,  W.,  Thc  State  Against  Blacks,  New  York,  McGraw-Hill,  1982. 
nomics,  vol.  11,  1988. 